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Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of lockup agreements on management earnings forecasts in 
initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. Using a sample of 312 French firms that went public 
over the period 1997–2016, we find that IPOs with lockup agreements are more likely to 
disclose conservative earnings forecasts. In particular, we provide evidence that IPOs with 
more locked-up shares and those selecting longer lockup periods, have more accurate 
management earnings forecasts. In other words, managers of firms with a higher proportion 
of shares locked up and longer lockup agreements experience greater costs of non-
diversification of idiosyncratic risk. They tend, thus, to provide more conservative and 
accurate forecasts to prevent costs arising from earnings forecast error. These results are robust 
to a number of sensitivity tests. 
 
 
Keywords: Lockup; Initial public offerings; Management earnings forecasts; France 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The finance literature recognizes that firms going public may face severe 
problems arising from information asymmetries between corporate insiders and 
investors during the initial public offering (IPO) process (see, e.g., Brav and Gompers, 
2003; Courteau, 1995; Hughes, 1986). Previous studies show that these problems could 
be mitigated through underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993; 
Ellul and Pagano, 2006), venture capital backing (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991), prestigious underwriter backing (Carter and Manaster, 1990), and 
engaging reputable auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986). 
In the same vein, Hughes (1986) argues that voluntary disclosure plays a major 
role in reducing information asymmetries between issuers of IPOs and investors. 
Voluntary disclosure may represent a signaling mechanism that helps to discriminate 
between high and low quality firms. This author identifies management earnings 
forecasts in an IPO prospectus as a potential signal of firm quality. Moreover, a 
growing body of literature shows that lockup commitments can also serve as signaling 
devices to communicate the inherent quality of IPO firms (Bradley et al., 2001; Brav 
and Gompers, 2003; Courteau, 1995; Field and Hanka, 2001). 
This study extends the growing body of literature on the signaling role of 
earnings forecast disclosures (Boubaker et al., 2017; Boubaker and Labégore, 2006; 
Chen and Firth, 1999; Cheng and Firth, 2000; Clarkson et al., 1992; Firth, 1998; Jog and 
MacConomy, 2003; Mak, 1996, among others) by examining the link between lockup 
agreements and earnings forecast disclosures in IPO prospectuses. Specifically, this 
paper addresses the following research question: Is there a relation between lockup 
characteristics and management earnings forecasts of IPO firms? 
In lockup periods, the initial shareholders are prevented from selling their equity 
holdings. On NASDAQ, this time period is generally 180 days after publication of the 
IPO prospectus. However, in some cases, the period can span from 120 days to 1 year. 
Under certain conditions, if shareholders have beneficially owned their shares for less 
than two years, they submit to specific rules of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and in particular the SEC rule 144. This rule obliges them to make 
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public their sales of shares and to fix quotas for these transfers so as not to dramatically 
affect stock prices. 
Prior to January 2000, U.S. regulation imposed compulsory lockup agreements 
only for firms with a trading history of less than 3 years. Since January 2000, lockup 
contracts have not been mandatory and have become voluntary contracts in which 
both underwriters and issuers jointly determine the length of the lockup period. 
However, most firms adopt lockup agreements. In Germany, all pre-IPO shareholders 
that still own shares immediately after the firm locks up are subject to mandatory 
lockups. The initial shareholders must be locked up for 6 months with 100% of their 
shares. The French regulation provides companies with a choice between preserving 
their shares for 180 days for 100% of shares or for 360 days for 80% of shares. On the 
Second Market in France, there is no obligation on this matter, but certain companies 
make such commitments. 
In this study, we use management earnings forecast data obtained from a sample 
of 312 prospectuses of French IPO firms over the period 1997–2016. We find that IPO 
firms with more shares to lock up, and those selecting longer lockup periods exhibit 
more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to a battery 
of robustness checks, including, among others, the use of an alternative measure of 
earnings forecast errors and excluding the crisis years. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is, to the best of 
our knowledge, among the first to examine the impact of lockup structure on IPO 
earnings forecast accuracy. Specifically, it investigates the relation between (i) length 
of lockup period, and (ii) percentage of equity locked up by shareholders on the 
credibility of earnings forecasts. Second, this research adds to the literature on the 
determinants of earnings forecast accuracy of newly-listed firms (e.g., Mak, 1994; Jaggi, 
1997; Labégorre and Boubaker, 2005). Thus, it offers new evidence to the debate on the 
role of lockup agreements in IPO firms (e.g., Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and 
Gompers, 2003). 
Lockup agreements in France, like many other countries, prevent the initial 
shareholders of IPO companies from selling a specific amount of their equity for a 
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contractually specified post-IPO period. Yet, newly listed firms in France, unlike in the 
United States, are allowed to present their earnings management forecasts in their 
prospectuses. This helps observing the relationship between lockup commitments and 
the quality of earnings forecast information in French IPO prospectuses. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
institutional background description relating to lockup agreements and management 
earnings forecasts, and develops the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample 
and defines the variables that are used in the analysis. Section 4 explains model 
specifications and discusses the results of the empirical analyses. Section 5 summarizes 
the paper and concludes. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
This section presents arguments suggesting a potential relation between lockups 
and IPO earnings forecasts. We first present a background description of the earnings 
forecasts in IPO prospectuses. We then provide a brief discussion of the structure of 
lockup contracts and develop our research hypotheses on how lockup agreements 
affect earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. 
2.1. Earnings forecast disclosure 
There is a large body of literature that focuses on management earnings forecasts 
due to the importance of the issue to investors (Wang et al., 2008; Abhayawansa and 
Abeysekera, 2009). Verrecchia (1983) claims that earnings forecasts play a significant 
signaling role since their publication provides investors with private information. In 
the same vein, Firth (1998) and Cheng and Firth (2000) demonstrate that disclosure of 
future earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectuses can be an important signal that helps 
in valuing firms. In fact, accurate forecasts mitigate information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and thus lower agency costs. Moreover, an IPO that provides 
accurate and reliable disclosure ensures lower information asymmetry and signals to 
outsiders that the firm is performing better than its peers (Miller, 2002). 
The past three decades have witnessed a tremendous amount of academic 
research on IPOs. However, only a limited number of studies examine the 
determinants and accuracy of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses (e.g., Clarkson et 
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al., 1989; Keasey and McGuiness, 1991; Firth and Smith, 1992; Firth et al., 1995; Jelic et 
al., 1998; Jog and McConomy, 2003; Mbuthia and Ward, 2003; Jaggi et al., 2006; 
Gounopoulos, 2011; Cormier et al., 2014). For instance, Keasey and McGuiness (1991) 
argue that including an earnings forecast in an IPO firm’s prospectus depends upon 
its competitive position. Cormier et al. (2014) provide evidence that Canadian IPO 
firms with better governance are less likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts 
in their prospectuses. 
Moreover, previous studies on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts 
have reported mixed results. In this vein, Keasey and McGuiness (1991), Mbuthia and 
Ward (2003), and Jaggi et al. (2006) show that, on average, managers of IPO firms 
underestimate future earnings, while Firth and Smith (1992) and Hartnett and Romcke 
(2000) find negative average forecast errors, implying that managers of IPOs are 
optimistic in their earnings forecasts. Previous studies also show mixed results 
concerning the magnitude of absolute forecast errors. In this respect, Keasey and 
McGuinness (1991) and Jaggi (1997) find an average absolute forecast error of 11% (in 
Singapore) and 12.79% (in Hong Kong), respectively. Other studies, however, report 
an average absolute forecast error of more than 80% (e.g., Mak, 1989; Firth and Smith, 
1992; Hartnett and Romcke, 2000). 
2.2. Lockup Agreements 
A large number of studies on IPOs examine the usefulness of lockup agreements. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) focus on the determinants of lockup period and consider 
three objectives to the use of lockup provisions: (i) a signaling mechanism to adverse 
selection problem; (ii) a commitment mechanism to moral hazard problem, and (iii) a 
rent extraction solution by powerful underwriters. These authors find evidence that 
lockup is an effective bonding device to overcome post-IPO moral hazard problems. 
However, they reject the hypothesis that lockup is a signaling device to an adverse 
selection problem. Brau et al. (2015) revisit this research area and find support for the 
concern that insiders signal their quality using longer lockup period since it is 
associated with larger asymmetric information and lower idiosyncratic risk.  
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Many other studies were also carried to explain existing contradictory findings. 
Using a sample of 4,025 IPO firms between 1988 and 2006, Yung and Zender (2010) 
argue that IPO issues are likely to lock in their shares for a long period to alleviate both 
moral hazard and information asymmetry problems subsequent to the IPO. Karpoff et 
al. (2013) analyze 2,579 SEOs from 1996 to 2006 and treat lockup agreements as a 
contracting solution to asymmetric information phenomenon between insiders and 
new investors. Their results give support to the idea that lockups help to ensure the 
quality of an issue to the outside investors. In the same thread, Hoque (2014) examines 
a sample of UK IPOs listed between 1999 and 2006 and find evidence that lockups 
mitigate post-IPO moral hazard problems. 
2.3. Hypotheses development 
At the time of flotation, the quality of a particular firm is not apparent to outside 
investors. High quality firms may be concerned that potential investors would not be 
willing to pay a high price for their equity. Even if stock issues are, on average, fairly 
priced, high quality firms would still suffer from mispricing losses, because they are 
pooled with low firms. Hence, investors could be not abe to distinguish between high 
quality and low quality firms. In contrast, incumbent shareholders, who are involved 
in firm management, tend to have a better picture of the firm’s prospects. They are 
more inclined to make optimistic forecasts to achieve a better offering price, but there 
are mechanisms that can mitigate this opportunistic behavior such as lockups. IPO 
lockup agreements give insiders motivation to provide truthful earnings forecasts and 
can guarantee investors that insiders remain committed to the firm until such time 
when more information concerning future earnings prospects are divulged to the 
public through news, analyst reports, and regulatory filings. 
Following Leland and Pyle (1977), Courteau (1995) argues that the length of the 
lockup could serves as a mechanism to reduce asymmetric information, and thus as a 
signal of firm quality. This author claims that high quality IPOs signal their quality by 
implementing longer lockups. Moreover, Brav and Gompers (2003) document that 
lockup agreements play a significant role in alleviating moral hazard, signaling the 
quality of issuing firms and generating additional profit to the underwriter. 
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In a similar vein, Chong and Ho (2007) claim that managers of firms with longer 
lockup periods are associated with longer periods of non-diversification of 
idiosyncratic risk. As a consequence, entrepreneurs tend to provide more conservative 
and more accurate forecasts to avoid the costs related to forecast errors, which can 
negatively affect the wealth of insiders and the long-term performance of the firm. 
The foregoing reasoning leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Firms with a higher percentage of shares locked up ussye more conservative earnings 
forecasts. 
H2: Firms with longer lockup periods issue more conservative earnings forecasts. 
 
3. Data and variables 
This section describes data sources and sample selection procedure. It defines 
the variables used in our analysis and provides descriptive statistics. 
3.1. Sample selection and data sources 
Our initial sample consists of all French IPOs listed between 1997 and 2016 on 
the Second Marché and Nouveau Marché. We first eliminate financial corporations (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and IPOs from utility industries (two-digit SIC code 49) because their 
earnings are highly regulated. We exclude foreign IPOs, transfers between market 
compartments, as well as issues listed on the over-the-counter market (Marché Libre). 
We also discard firms with missing financial data. This process yields a final sample 
of 312 IPOs. Financial and specific information concerning IPOs are gathered from IPO 
prospectuses, annual reports published on firm websites and the website of the 
Financial Market Authority1. 
Table 1 presents the distribution by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B) of 
the full sample as well as the forecasters’ subsample. In Panel A, we observe a 
significant decrease in the proportion of forecasters over the 2005–2016 period (less 
than 40%) compared to the previous period. This finding could be due to the reform 
of the Paris Stock Exchange implemented on 21 February 2005. Panel B of Table 1 
                                                           
1 Autorité des Marchés Financier is the French equivalent of the SEC..  
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reports the distribution of our sample firms by industry2. The two industries that have 
a higher percentage of IPOs are services (41.91%) and consumer durables (18.32%). 
Note also that 81.48% (79.41%) of IPOs in the leisure (textile & trade) industry provide 
an earnings forecast in their prospectuses, while only 47.50% of the basic industry 
firms publish their earnings forecasts during the IPO. Table 2 presents the distribution 
of lockup periods. The mean (median) lockup lengths for forecasters are 14.2 (12.0). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2. Regression variables 
Appendix A summarizes the definitions and measurement of all variables used 
in the analysis. 
3.2.1. Dependent variable: Earnings forecast error 
Following Chin et al. (2006), we compute earnings forecast errors as the 
difference between forecasted earnings and actual earnings, all scaled by total assets. 
Earnings are profits after tax and before extraordinary items. We define forecast error 
as: 
                                                          
( )
100it itit
FP AP
FE
Total assets
−
= 
                 
  (1) 
where, FE is forecast error for the IPO; AP is the actual earnings of the IPO; and FP is 
the earnings forecast as provided in the IPO prospectus. The mean forecast error 
reflects the degree of bias in forecasting. If the forecasted earnings are lower than 
actual earnings, FE is negative, implying a pessimistic (conservative) bias in managers' 
forecasts, while a positive FE indicates an optimistic bias. 
                                                           
2 We classify the industry of our sample firms using the Campbell (1996) industry classification. When 
we rerun the regressions by including industry variables, our findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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To proxy for the magnitude of forecast error, we use absolute forecast error 
(AFE), measured as follows: 
                                                                  it it
AFE FE=
                                                     
(2) 
3.2.2. Variables of interest: Lockup agreements 
We determine whether a firm has a lockup agreement by investigating IPO 
prospectuses. If it has an agreement, we check whether it is a voluntary contract and 
collect the expiration date of the lockup and the fraction of shares subject to lockup. 
We consider two lockup-related variables to proxy for the presence of voluntary 
lockup agreements and the characteristics of these contracts: (i) LOCKUP_PER is the 
percentage of shares subject to lockup; and (ii) LOCKUP_LENGTH is the number of 
months after the listing date during which the insiders agree not to sell a specified 
number of their shares. 
3.2.3. Control variables 
The literature identifies a set of factors that are expected to affect earnings 
forecast accuracy. These control variables included in the model are firm size, firm age, 
horizon forecast, financial leverage, ownership, and stock exchange. 
Size is proxied using the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of euros. 
It is argued that earnings forecast errors depend on firm size. Previous research shows 
that it is easier for large firms to generate credible forecasts, since they have more 
control of their market settings and more influence over the level of their profits (Chan 
et al., 1996; Chen et al., 2001). Also, large firms are usually more diversified, able to 
cope with economic fluctuations, and so are able to contend with unpredicted financial 
events (Firth and Smith, 1992; Hagerman and Ruland, 1997). Other studies document 
that large-sized firms benefit from more available information, more detailed 
disclosure strategies, and better predicting systems, since they are followed by more 
prestigious analysts (Mefteh-Wali et al., 2012). 
HORIZON (Horizon forecast) is defined as the number of months between the date 
of issue of the prospectus and the first post-listing year-end of the company. Under 
certain circumstances, the horizon forecast may become a potential proxy for forecast 
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credibility. It has been argued that forecasts with a longer time horizon may make 
forecasting of the firm’s earnings more complicated. Indeed, the longer the time lapse 
between the release of the forecast and the realization of the forecast, the more the firm 
will be associated with uncertainty (Jaggi, 1997). Therefore, short-term earnings are 
intrinsically easier to predict (Firth et al., 1995). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2000) 
suggest that the length of the forecast horizon is the most important determinant of 
earnings predictability. 
LNAGE is proxied by the natural logarithm of the number of years between 
establishment of the firm and the IPO date. Earlier studies show evidence that age is 
negatively associated with forecast error. In fact, mature companies have longer 
experience, historical bases and are in a better position to control their market situation 
(Hartnett and Rômcke, 2000). However, firms that went public just a few years after 
their creation suffer from comparatively lower level of appreciation, so that they tend 
to provide a more optimistic picture of their future performance prospects (Firth et al., 
1995; Jaggi, 1997). 
LEVERAGE (Financial Leverage) is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The 
financial leverage of a company indicates the fraction of firm profit expensed as 
interest. In fact, firms with higher leverage face higher levels of debt, and so more risk 
factors (Jaggi, 1997; Chen et al., 2001). Eddy and Seifert (1992) claim that higher 
leverage can cause greater fluctuation in earnings and therefore make the earnings 
forecast process more uncertain and difficult. Thus, firms with important levels of debt 
are likely to experience more volatile earnings. 
OWNERSHIP controls for the equity stock held by all inside board members. 
Several studies focus on ownership retained and its impact on management earnings 
forecasts. Most of this research emphasizes that forecast quality might be affected by 
the fraction of shares retained by insiders (Ajinkya at al., 2005). Firms with higher 
retained ownership face fewer information asymmetry problems (Leland and Pyle, 
1977), hence, they are likely to provide conservative earnings forecasts. In other words, 
firms with higher retained ownership have incentives to signal their quality by 
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providing conservative forecasts. As a result, forecast accuracy increases in the case of 
high insider ownership. 
NM (Nouveau Marché) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is listed on the 
Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise. Prior French studies consider two distinct 
exchanges where most companies go public: the Second Marché and Nouveau Marché. 
While the Second Marché is designed to serve well-known and large companies, the 
Nouveau Marché was created to attract smaller-size offerings with a short history, 
mainly in high-technology industries. It follows then that firms undertaking an IPO 
on the Nouveau Marché are riskier than those choosing the Second Marché for listing. 
Furthermore, IPOs on the Nouveau Marché are required to generate forecast financial 
statements of at least a three-year history, but there are no such requirements for 
Second Marché offerings. According to Degeorge and Derrien (2001), managers are less 
conservative for Nouveau Marché IPOs, which is explained by the relationship between 
ex ante uncertainty and manager optimism. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. On 
average, our sample IPOs lock up around 80% (median, 81.56%) of their post-IPO 
insiders’ shares with a mean (median) lockup period of about 14 months (12 months). 
The forecast horizon ranges from less than two weeks (0.3) to slightly more than one 
year (12.36 months), with an average of 6.30 months. Furthermore, the sample includes 
newly founded (minimum age of 2 months) and old (maximum age of 115 years) firms, 
with an average age of more than 14 years. It also includes low-leveraged (minimum 
of 3.52%) and highly leveraged (maximum of 94.23) firms, with an average leverage 
ratio of 57.34%. In addition, pre-IPO insiders retain, on average, about 61.60% of their 
firms’ shares. Moreover, 28.92% of the sample firms are listed on the Nouveau Marché. 
Panel B of Table 3 depicts Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the 
diagonal) correlations between the regressors. The correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables used in the same specification are low, which provides some 
assurance that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. In addition, we calculate the 
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variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each specification as an additional test for 
multicollinearity. The VIFs do not exceed the critical value of 10 (Neter et al., 1989), 
with a maximum value of 2.2, implying that multicollinearity does not appear to pose 
a serious problem. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents the distribution of forecast errors. As shown, 20.19% (22.76%) 
of forecast errors are less (greater) than -10% (10%) of the forecast errors. Moreover,     
75.32 % of the earnings forecast are positive indicating that there is optimistic bias in 
the forecasts issued by the IPO firms.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section details the empirical model, presents and discusses the main results, 
and sets forth several sensitivity tests. 
4.1. Empirical model 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we estimate the following cross-sectional model: 
FORECAST = β0 + β1 LOCKUP + β2 SIZE + β3 HORIZON + β4 LNAGE + β5 LEVERAGE 
+ β6 OWNERSHIP + β7 NM   + Industry dummies + Year dummies                        (3) 
The dependent variable is the earnings forecast error, which indicates the 
difference between the earnings forecast provided in the IPO prospectus and actual 
earnings, deflated by total assets. The key variable of interest is LOCKUP, which is 
predicted to be negative. Control variables are SIZE, HORIZON, LNAGE, LEVERAGE, 
OWNERSHIP and NM. 
4.2. The voluntary earnings forecast disclosure decision 
In this subsection, we examine the determinants that affect a firm’s choice to issue 
an earnings forecast. Thus, we run a logistic regression that explains the decision of 
IPO firms to disclose voluntary earnings forecasts. In this case, the dependent variable 
FORECAST is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm provides an 
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earnings forecast in its prospectus, and 0 otherwise. We use the same set of 
independent variables as in Equation 3.  
Table 5 reports the results of the logistic regression of FORECAST. First, we find 
that larger IPO firms are more likely to disclose an earnings forecast in their 
prospectuses. This finding implies that larger firms have more control of their market 
setting, making it easier to forecast (Cox, 1985; Firth and Smith, 1992; Brown et al., 
2000; Chen et al., 2001). Managers of old firms are also more inclined to publish 
earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses as they have longer business experience 
and better capabilities to control the financial situation. In addition, OWNERSHIP 
appears to be positively related to voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. This 
result suggests that firms with higher retained ownership are more likely to forecast 
their profits, since they face fewer information asymmetry problems (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). Because of differing listing requirements, firms listed in the Nouveau Marché are 
more likely to disclose their earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. We also find that 
firms in industrial sectors are more likely to issue forecasts compared to firms in other 
industries. The coefficient estimates of the other explanatory variables show the 
expected signs, but are not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3. Evidence on the impact of lockup on earnings forecast errors 
Tables 5 and 6 report regression results of Equation (3) using, respectively, 
earnings forecast bias (FE) and earnings forecast accuracy (AFE) as dependent 
variables. These tables present the results from ordinary least squares regressions for 
our sample IPOs over the 1997–2016 period. Each column in the tables represents a 
variant of the regression. In each specification, we consider two groups of independent 
variables. First, our main concern is the coefficient estimates for the lockup-related 
variables. Thus, we include in the first specification the variable LP_PER, which 
proxies for lockup agreement. This variable is equal to the percentage of shares subject 
to lockup. In the second specification, we use the variable LP_LENGTH, which 
indicates the lockup period. The second group consists of firm–specific characteristics 
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variables that have been shown in previous literature to affect earnings forecasts, 
namely, SIZE, HORIZON, LNAGE, LEVERAGE, OWNERSHIP and NM. 
Table 6 provides empirical results for forecast bias. In all specifications, the VIFs 
are less than 2, indicating the absence of multicollinearity problems. The first 
specification includes the variable LP_PER, which equals the fraction of shares subject 
to lockup. The results show that the coefficient of this variable exerts a negative and 
significant impact (at the 1% level) on forecast errors. This finding indicates that IPOs 
of companies with a higher proportion of shares locked up experience small earnings 
forecast errors (H1). In the second specification, we use the variable LP_LENGTH, 
which is equal to the length of the lockup period in months. As expected, the coefficient 
of this variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding 
implies that longer lockup agreements are associated with smaller earnings forecast 
errors, which is consistent with H2. In sum, these findings provide support for our 
main hypotheses, which state that IPO firms with higher shares locked up and longer 
lockup period might be not able to diversify their idiosyncratic risk, thus providing 
more conservative forecasts. 
With regard to the control variables, we report negative and highly significant 
coefficients for SIZE, showing that larger firms provide more conservative forecasts. 
Moreover, management in industrial-sector firms have incentive to provide 
conservative earnings forecasts. It seems that there is no difference in terms of forecast 
bias between firms that are listed on the Nouveau Marché and those on the Second 
Marché. The coefficient of NM is positive but statistically non-significant. Firm age, 
leverage and forecast horizon do not also seem to affect management earnings forecast 
bias.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
We now rerun our main regressions from Table 6 using earnings forecast 
accuracy (AFE) as a dependent variable rather than earnings forecast bias (FE). The 
results are reported in Table 7. We find that our previous results on the lockup 
variables remain qualitatively the same. In all specifications, the coefficients of the 
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variables LP_PER and LP_LENGTH are negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. These findings indicate that lockup agreements are associated with more 
accurate earnings forecasts. In other words, these results provide support for our 
hypotheses, which state that IPO firms with voluntary lockup agreements should have 
less absolute earnings forecast errors than other ones. This is consistent with the view 
that insiders of IPO firms with contractual lockup agreements, those selecting more 
shares to lockup or longer lockup periods have greater incentives to provide truthful 
earnings forecasts, since they are more exposed to more idiosyncratic risk. 
Among the control variables included in the model, coefficient estimates for SIZE 
and NM confirm the predicted sign and are statistically significant. In particular, the 
coefficient of SIZE is consistent with previous research suggesting that larger 
companies are associated with a lower level of earnings forecast error, since they are 
typically more diversified and have more control over their market settings (Clarkson, 
2000; Chen et al., 2001). Moreover, firms listed on the Nouveau Marché tend to achieve 
a significantly higher level of credibility. Specification (1) shows that the coefficient 
estimate on OWNERSHIP is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
suggests that the higher the percentage of shares retained by insiders, the more 
accurate are the earnings forecasts. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.4. Sensitivity tests 
To check the robustness of our main findings, several supplementary tests are 
conducted. First, we carry out an additional regression analysis taking in account a 
possible selection bias since firm’s characteristics can distinguish firms that publish 
earnings forecasts from others. Therefore, we use Heckman’s (1970) two stage 
procedure to correct for this possible bias. In the first stage, we explain the decision to 
voluntarily publish earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectus. In the second stage, we 
explore the determinants of absolute forecast errors after correcting the sample 
selection bias using the inverse Mills ratio. The results are reported in Table 8.  
In the first stage, we use probit regression model where the dependent variable, 
denoted FORECAST, is a dummy variable taking the value one if the IPO manager has 
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published earnings forecast results in the prospectus. As shown in the first-stage 
regression in Table 8, lockup length, firm size and insiders’ ownership are associated 
with higher likelihood of disclosing earnings forecast in the prospectus. The second 
stage regression investigates the impact of lockup percentage (first specification) and 
lockup length (second specification) on the absolute forecast errors after correcting 
potential sample selection bias. As reported in Table 8, the coefficients of LP_PER and 
LP_LENGTH are negatively and significantly related to the absolute forecast errors, 
implying that managers of firms with lockup agreement (longer lockup period and 
larger IPO share lockup) are more likely to provide accurate earnings forecast. The 
results support our hypotheses (H1) and (H2).  Regarding control variables, we find a 
significantly negative relationship between firm size and absolute forecast errors 
which indicates that large firms tend to publish more accurate forecasts. The estimated 
coefficients of insiders’ ownership and Nouveau Marché are significantly positive, 
showing that firms with higher insider ownership and those listed in the Nouveau 
Marché are less likely to provide accurate predictions in their prospectuses. Generally, 
all the results are consistent with the baseline findings.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
To further strengthen the validity of our main results, we test whether our 
conclusions are robust to (i) using an alternative proxy for earnings forecast errors, (ii) 
modifying measurement of the lockup variable, (iii) excluding crisis years and  (iv) 
dropping service-industry firms. All results are presented in Table 9.3 
In the first specification of Table 9, we consider an alternative variable, square 
forecast error (SQFE), which proxies for earnings forecasts. The squared forecast error 
is calculated using the square of the forecast errors, which gives more weight to high 
errors. According to Firth and Smith (1992), SQFE better models the loss to investors 
due to an erroneous forecast. Specification (2) uses the natural logarithm of the lockup 
                                                           
3 For sake of brevity, we only include LP_LENGHT. Columns 2—4 (Table 9) report the results of 
regressions using absolute forecast error as the dependent variable. The results remain qualitatively 
similar when we use LOCKUP_PER as an alternative proxy for the importance of the lockup agreement.  
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period as an alternative measurement of the lockup variable. Specification (2) excludes 
firms that were listed during the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 from the sample. 
In the last specification, we drop firms operating in the services industry from the 
analysis as the results may be driven by firms from this particular industry due to their 
importance in our sample. Overall, none of these variations qualitatively affects our 
results. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
A large body of literature focuses on the quality of earnings forecasts in IPO 
prospectuses. This literature shows that many factors could affect IPO earnings 
forecast errors, such as corporate governance (Cormier et al., 2014) and underwriter 
reputation (Jelic et al., 2001). However, no attention has been given to the role of 
lockups in determining the accuracy of management earnings forecasts in IPOs.  
This study improves our understanding of how lockup agreements affect the quality 
of management earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that IPOs with higher percentage 
of shares subject to lockup and longer lockup period experience more conservative 
and accurate earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 312 forecasts of French IPOs listed 
between 1997 and 2016, our empirical results suggest that lockup percentage and 
lockup period are positively associated with more accurate earnings forecasts. The 
underlying reasoning is consistent with Chong and Ho (2007), who predict that longer 
lockup periods correspond to longer periods of non-diversification of idiosyncratic 
risk. Insiders of firms selecting more shares to lockup and longer lockup periods tend 
to provide credible earnings forecasts because they are more exposed to idiosyncratic 
risk. Our findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests including the use of 
alternative proxies for earning forecast errors and lockup contacts, excluding the crisis 
period and discarding service-industry firms.
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Appendix A 
Variable, Definitions, and Sources 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A. Dependent variable 
FE 
 
The forecast errors measured as the difference between forecast earnings and 
actual earnings, all scaled by total assets. 
 
AMF website and 
Authors’ calculation 
AFE It reflects the absolute deviation of actual earnings, from forecast earnings. As above 
Panel B. Independent variables 
LOCKUP_PER The percentage of shares subject to lockup. AMF website and 
Authors’ calculation 
LOCKUP_LENGTH Lockup length in months. As above 
SIZE 
HORIZON 
The natural logarithm of the total assets in thousand of euros during the forecast 
period. 
The number of months between the date of issue of the prospectus and the first 
post-listing year-end date. 
Worldscope 
AMF website and 
Authors’ calculation   
LNAGE The natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment. As above 
LEVERAGE 
 
OWNERSHIP 
Financial leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. 
The capital retained by insiders measured as one minus the percentage of shares 
raised to the total outstanding shares. 
Worldscope  
AMF website and 
Authors’ calculation   
NM A dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero 
otherwise. 
As above 
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Table 1.  Sample distribution by year and by industry 
 Full Sample   Forecasters 
 Number Percentage 
 
Number 
Percentage of 
Raw Total 
Panel A : Distribution by Year 
1997 51 9.94  42 82.35 
1998 105 20.47  80 76.19 
1999 59 11.50  54 91.53 
2000 59 11.50  58 98.31 
2001 14 2.73  14 100 
2002 8 1.56  7 87.50 
2003 0 0.00  0 0 
2004 8 1.56  6 75.00 
2005 22 4.29  8 36.36 
2006 55 10.72  15 27.27 
2007 23 4.48  6 26.09 
2008 4 0.78  1 25.00 
2009 2 0.39  0 0.00 
2010 14 2.73  4 28.57 
2011 15 2.92  6 40.00 
2012 9 1.75  1 11.11 
2013 11 2.14  1 9.09 
2014 19 3.70  3 15.59 
2015 23 4.48  4 17.39 
2016 12 2.34  2 16.67 
Total 513 100  312 60.82 
Panel B : Distribution by Industry 
Petroleum 4 0.78  2 50.00 
Consumer durables 94 18.32  52 55.32 
Basic industry 40 7.80  19 47.50 
Food and tobacco 12 2.34  9 75.00 
Construction 11 2.14  6 54.55 
Capital goods 55 10.72  32 58.18 
Transportation 21 4.09  11 52.38 
Textiles & trades 34 6.63  27 79.41 
Services 215 41.91  132 61.04 
Leisure 27 5.26  22 81.48 
Total 513 100  312 60.82 
Notes: This table presents the sample distributions by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B). The sample 
consists of 513 French IPOs subsequently listed on the Euronext from January 1997 to December 2016. 
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Table 2. Distribution of lockup lengths 
Lockup Period Forecasters 
 Number Percentage 
10.89 
70.19 
18.92 
100 
6 Months 34 
12 Months 219 
>12 months 59 
Total 312 
Mean (Months) 14.2 
12.0 Median (Months) 
Notes: This table presents the distribution of lockup period for the forecasters.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics and correlations 
Variables LOCKUP_PER   LOCKUP_LENGTH SIZE HORIZON LNAGE LEVERAGE OWNERSHIP NM 
Minimum 10.000 3.000 8.457 0.300 -1.833 0.035 0.000 0.000 
Median 81.558 12.000 10.667 6.161 2.303 0.546 0.627 0.000 
Mean 80 14.238 12.076 6.300 2.671 0.573 0.616 0.289 
Maximum 100.000 36.000 23.592 12.367 4.745 0.942 0.964 1.000 
Standard deviation 8.845 7.896 3.264 2.528 2.291 0.175 0.191 0.458 
Variables 
L
O
C
K
U
P
_P
E
R
 
L
O
C
K
U
P
_L
E
N
G
T
H
 
S
IZ
E
 
H
O
R
IZ
O
N
 
L
N
A
G
E
 
L
E
V
E
R
A
G
E
 
O
W
N
E
R
S
H
IP
 
N
M
 
LOCKUP_PER 1.000   –0.528**** 0.086*   –0.035    –0.097**     –0.084*     –0.110**  0.097**    
LOCKUP_LENGTH    –0.227***            1.000   –0.075 –0.034       –0.027     0.043      –0.050     0.146***   
SIZE  0.039   –0.106**        1.000  0.051    –0.011        0.115**         0.004                0.071    
HORIZON –0.023            –0.045    0.087*     1.000 0.047 –0.048   –0.042                0.023   
LNAGE  –0.085*          –0.077     –0.021     0.052        1.000   0.068 0.119**    –0.174*** 
LEVERAGE –0.027        0.119**   –0.002     0.000     –0.081*    1.000  0.133*** –0.231*** 
OWNERSHIP –0.035   –0.140 ***    –0.041       –0.073    0.083*  –0.078     1.000 –0.377*** 
NM     0.100**       0.292***       0.203***     0.016  –0.188***   –0.051 –0.331***                  1.000 
Notes: Panel A of this table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Panel B shows Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables used in the regressions. The sample consists of 312 French IPOs over the period 1997–2016. LOCKUP_PER is the percentage of shares 
locked up. LOCKUP_LENGTH is the lockup period in months. SIZE equals to the natural logarithm of the total assets in thousand of euros.  HORIZON is the number of months 
between the date of issue of the prospectus and the first post-listing year-end date. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment. LEVERAGE is financial 
leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the capital retained by insiders measured as one minus the percentage of shares raised to the total outstanding 
shares. NM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise.  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of forecast errors 
Range in percentage Number Percentage 
FE 0.1 71 22.76 
52.56 
4.49 
20.19 
100 
0.0   FE  0.1 164 
-0.1   FE   0.0 14 
FE  -0.1 63 
Total 312 
Mean  0.031 
0.018 Median  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of forecast errors.  
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Table 5. Logistic regression of voluntary forecast diclosure 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results from the logistic regression of voluntary earnings forecast disclosure 
on its determinants.  The dependent variable is FORECAST which takes one if the IPO firm provides an earnings 
forecast in its IPO prospectus and 0 otherwise. SIZE equals to the natural logarithm of the total assets in thousand 
of euros.  HORIZON is the number of months between the date of issue of the prospectus and the first post-listing 
year-end date. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment. LEVERAGE is financial 
leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the capital retained by insiders measured as 
one minus the percentage of shares raised to the total outstanding shares. NM is a dummy variable set to one if the 
firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise. Industry dummies and year dummies are included but 
not reported in the table.  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Coefficient  t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  -3.8989d  4.40*** 
SIZE  0.1821  3.51*** 
HORIZON  -0.0326            -0.77 
LNAGE  0.2062             1.75* 
LEVERAGE  -0.1515            -0.88 
OWNERSHIP  1.7586  2.69*** 
NM  1.1896  3.69*** 
INDUSTRY  Yes             Yes 
YEARS  Yes              Yes 
Observations    513 
Pseudo R²     0.1282*** 
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Table 6. OLS regression results of FE 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results from regressing earnings forecast errors (bias) on lockup-related 
proxies and control variables. In column 1, LOCKUP_PER is the percentage of shares locked up. In columns 2, we 
replace LOCKUP_PER with LOCKUP_LENGTH, which is the lockup period in months. SIZE equals to the natural 
logarithm of the total assets in thousand of euros. HORIZON is the number of months between the date of issue of 
the prospectus and the first post-listing year-end date. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
establishment. LEVERAGE is financial leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the 
capital retained by insiders measured as one minus the percentage of shares raised to the total outstanding shares. 
NM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise. Industry 
dummies and year dummies are included but not reported in the table . 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Expected sign (1) (2) 
INTERCEPT  25.3351*** 12.6422*** 
  (3.69) (2.47) 
LP_PER – -0.2356***  
  (-3.55)  
LP_LENGTH –  -0.1833*** 
   (-2.66) 
SIZE – -0.6460*** -0.7618*** 
  (-4.02) (-4.59) 
HORIZON + 0.0735 -0.0203 
  (0.37) (-0.10) 
LNAGE – 0.0756 0.0564 
  (0.14) (0.11) 
LEVERAGE + -0.0615 0.0050 
  (-0.38) (0.03) 
OWNERSHIP + 3.9218 3.0232 
  (1.40) (1.06) 
NM + 1.7866 1.6086 
  (1.40) (1.25) 
INDUSTRY . Yes Yes 
YEARS  Yes Yes 
Observations  312 312 
Adjusted R2  0.062*** 0.098** 
F–value  4.2736*** 3.4341*** 
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Table 7. OLS regression results of AFE 
Notes: This table presents estimation results from regressing absolute earnings forecast errors on lockup-related 
proxies and control variables. In column 1, LOCKUP_PER is the percentage of shares locked up. In columns 2, we 
replace LOCKUP_PER with LOCKUP_LENGTH, which is the lockup period in months. SIZE equals to the natural 
logarithm of the total assets in thousand of euros. HORIZON is the number of months between the date of issue of 
the prospectus and the first post-listing year-end date. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
establishment LEVERAGE is financial leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the 
capital retained by insiders measured as one minus the percentage of shares raised to the total outstanding shares. 
NM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise. Industry 
dummies and year dummies are included but not reported in the table. 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Expected sign (1) (2) 
INTERCEPT  21.1152*** 12.8983** 
  (3.12) (2.55) 
LP_PER – -0.1724***  
  (-2.68)  
LP_LENGTH –  -0.1714*** 
   (-2.60) 
SIZE – -0.7915*** -0.8962*** 
  (-5.09) (-5.62) 
HORIZON + 0.1049 0.0273 
  (0.55) (0.14) 
LNAGE – -0.0017 -0.0220 
  (-0.01) (-0.04) 
LEVERAGE + -0.0411 0.0211 
  (-0.26) (0.13) 
OWNERSHIP + 4.4783* 3.6956 
  (1.69) (1.35) 
NM + 2.6660** 2.7168** 
  (2.14) (2.16) 
INDUSTRY . Yes Yes 
YEARS  Yes Yes 
Observations  312 312 
Adjusted R²  0.070*** 0.071*** 
F–value  4.8343*** 4.7872*** 
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Table 8. Heckman selection model 
Stage-one : 
FORECAST 
Stage-two : 
AFE 
INTERCEPT -7.6182*** INTERCEPT 0.2352*** 0.1405*** 
 (-6.7942)  (4.1599) (4.2484) 
LP_LENGTH 0.2358*** LP_PER -0.0017***  
 (4.3095)  (-2.7469)  
SIZE 0.1334*** LP_LENGTH  -0.0017*** 
 (2.9044)   (-2.7040) 
HORIZON 0.0461 SIZE -0.0078*** -0.0087*** 
 (1.3011)  (-5.3142) (-5.7976) 
LNAGE 0.1081 HORIZON 0.0010 0.0002 
 (1.2127)  (0.5244) (0.0943) 
LEVERAGE 1.1535* LNAGE -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (1.8013)  (-0.1728) (-0.1680) 
OWNERSHIP 1.8449*** LEVERAGE -0.0004 0.0002 
 (3.5375)  (-0.2674) (0.1171) 
NM 9.4184 OWNERSHIP 0.0453* 0.0378 
 (0.0003)  (1.7341) (1.4430) 
INDUSTRY Yes NM 0.0257** 0.0256** 
YEARS Yes  (2.1871) (2.1774) 
   LAMBDA 0.0749** 0.0762** 
    (2.4311) (2.5174) 
   INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
   YEARS Yes Yes 
        
Log likelihood  208.46 208.34 
Wald Chi2  39.81 39.56 
Observations 513  312 312 
 
The table reports the regression results using Heckman’s (1979) two‐stage selection model. In the first stage, the 
earnings forecast disclosure (FORECAST) is explained using a probit model. FORECAST is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 when the firm provides earnings forecast in its IPO prospectus and 0 otherwise. In the second 
stage, we include  the inverse Mills ratio to control for potential sample selection problem in our baseline equation. 
We estimate two specifications where the dependent variable is the absolute forecast errors AFE. The variable of 
interest is LOCKUP_PER (first specification) and LOCKUP_LENGTH (second specification). LOCKUP_PER is the 
percentage of shares locked up. LOCKUP_LENGTH is the lockup period in months. The control variables are the 
following: SIZE equals to the natural logarithm of the total assets in thousand of euros. HORIZON is the number 
of months between the date of issue of the prospectus and the first post-listing year-end date. LNAGE is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since establishment. LEVERAGE is financial leverage measured as total liabilities 
over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the capital retained by insiders measured as one minus the percentage of shares 
raised to the total outstanding shares. NM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO is on the Nouveau Marché, 
and zero otherwise. Industry dummies and year dummies are included but not reported in the table.  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 9. Sensitivity tests 
Variable 
Alternative 
forecast error 
metric SQFE 
Alternative 
lockup variable 
 
Excluding 2007–2008 firms 
Excluding 
service-industry 
firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 501.7051 25.1604*** 0.1482*** 8.7769*** 
 (1.16) (4.18) (4.39) (3.44) 
LP_LENGTH –13.4125**  –0.0020*** -0.0903** 
 (–2.37)  (–3.00) (-2.31) 
LN(LP_LENGTH)  –5.2420***   
  (–4.39)   
SIZE –28.6813** –0.9275*** –0.0090*** -0.7150*** 
 (–2.11) (–5.99) (–5.73) (-8.59) 
HORIZON 0.4073 –0.0244 0.0003 0.1553 
 (0.03) (–0.13) (0.14) (1.52) 
LNAGE 6.0870 –0.0745 –0.0017 -0.0177 
 (0.14) (–0.15) (–0.33) (-0.06) 
LEVERAGE 2.7189 0.0498 0.0002 0.8835 
 (0.20) (0.32) (0.14) (0.36) 
OWNERSHIP 50.7570 3.8068 0.0369 3.224** 
 (0.27) (1.43) (1.36) (2.08) 
NM 167.8727 0.7261** 0.0261** 1.7695** 
 (1.57) (2.26) (2.13) (2.46) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEARS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 312 312 304 180 
Adjusted R² 0.019 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.272*** 
     
Notes: This table reports the results of sensitivity tests. For sake of parsimony, only results using LP_LENGTH are reported in 
this table. In column 1, the dependent variable is the square forecast error. In column 2, we use an alternative Lockup-related 
variable namely, the natural logarithm of LP_LENGHTH. In column 3, we exclude firms listed during the crisis period (2007–
2008). The dependent variable in the last three columns is the absolute forecast errors (AFE). SIZE equals to the natural logarithm 
of the total assets in thousand of euros. HORIZON is the number of months between the date of issue of the prospectus and the 
first post-listing year-end date. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment. LEVERAGE is 
financial leverage measured as total liabilities over total assets. OWNERSHIP is the capital retained by insiders measured as 
one minus the percentage of shares raised to the total outstanding shares. NM is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s IPO 
is on the Nouveau Marché, and zero otherwise. Industry dummies and year dummies are included but not reported in the table. 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
